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Chapter	  One:	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Research	  Question	  	  	  	  
1.1.	  Introduction	  In	  1998,	  a	  25-­‐year	  concession	  contract	  on	  the	  water	  supply	  provision	   for	  DKI	   Jakarta	  was	  signed	   between	   Perusahaan	   Air	   Minum	   Jakarta	   Raya	   (PAM	   Jaya)	   and	   Thames	   Water	  Overseas,	  with	   local	  partner:	  PT.	  Kekar	  Pola	  Airindo,	  on	  the	  east	  side,	  and	  Suez	  Lyonnaise	  des	  Eaux	  with	  local	  partner:	  PT.	  Garuda	  Dipta	  Semesta	  on	  the	  west	  side.	  The	  Ciliwung	  River	  divided	   Jakarta	   into	   two	   areas	   for	   the	   concessionaires	   (Lanti,	   2006).	   The	   contract	   was	  signed	   and	   became	   effective	   in	   February	   1998.	   The	   fall	   of	   the	   Suharto	   administration	  delayed	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  contract.	  Later	  in	  1998,	  new	  negotiations	  were	  started	  to	  move	   the	   contract	   forward.	   These	   negotiations	   resulted	   in	   a	   Restated	   Cooperation	  Agreement	   that	  was	   signed	   in	  October	  2001.	  The	   Jakarta	   concession	   contract	  was	   among	  the	   biggest	   contracts	   executed	   in	   less	   developed	   countries.	   It	   was	   comparable	   in	   size	   to	  contracts	  in	  Manila,	  Philippines,	  and	  Buenos	  Aires,	  Argentina.	  	  	  The	   service	   coverage	   expanded	   from	  41%	   in	  1995	   to	  62%	   in	  2009,	  while	  many	   technical	  targets	  of	  the	  concession	  contracts	  were	  not	  achieved	  as	  expected.	  The	  private	  sectors	  have	  been	  criticized	   for	  only	  concentrating	   the	  expansion	  connections	   in	   the	  wealthier	  areas	  of	  the	   city	   (Bakker,	   2004,	   p.	   115),	   although	   the	   issue	   of	   connections,	  which	   related	   to	   other	  issues	  such	  as	  land	  and	  settlement	  issues	  with	  the	  local	  government	  of	  Jakarta	  in	  slum	  areas	  in	  Jakarta,	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  concession	  contract.	  	  




Further,	  the	  paper	  discusses	  conflicts	  in	  the	  system	  among	  the	  institutions	  and	  stakeholders	  involved	  and	  recommendations	  to	  overcome	  these	  conflicts.	  To	  understand	  the	  conflicts	  in	  the	   partnership,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   the	   perceptions	   of	   the	   stakeholders	   in	  drinking	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta.	  	  	  
1.3.	  Methodology	  In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	  process	  of	  privatization	  and	  progress	  achieved	   in	   the	  past	   ten	  years,	  qualitative	  data	  were	  gathered	  through	  interviews	  with	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  process.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  through	  two	  methods:	  (1)	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews;	  and	  (2)	  interviews	  through	  Skype.	  One	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interview	  was	  conducted	  with	  a	  World	  Bank	  official	   in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  who	   is	   knowledgeable	   about	   the	   early	   situation	   of	   the	   public-­‐private	  partnership	  of	  drinking	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta.	  The	  interview	  was	  recorded	  using	  Garage-­‐Band	  software	  and	  was	  conducted	  in	  English.	  	  	  Other	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   through	   phone	   conversations	   over	   Skype1.	   One	  stakeholder	   was	   interviewed	   in	   English	   was	   a	   Thames	   PAM	   Jaya	   representative	   who	   is	  knowledgeable	   of	   the	   negotiation	   process	   and	   another	   one	  who	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   progress	  between	  2001-­‐2005.	  	  	  Other	  stakeholders	   that	  were	   interviewed	   in	  Bahasa	   Indonesia,	   include:	   (1)	  PAM	  Jaya;	   (2)	  Jakarta	  Water	   Regulatory	   Body;	   (3)	   KruHa,	   People’s	   Coalition	   for	   the	   Right	   to	  Water,	   an	  active	  NGO	  with	  members	  in	  Jakarta,	  West	  Java,	  East	  Java,	  Central	  Java	  and	  Riau;	  and	  (4)	  an	  independent	  journalist	  experienced	  in	  investigating	  the	  public	  drinking	  water	  privatization	  process	  and	  its	  progress.	  	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  interviews	  were:	  1. To	  gather	  information	  about	  the	  process	  of	  negotiation	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  of	  drinking	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  each	  stakeholder.	  	  2. To	  gather	  information	  about	  the	  progress	  of	  this	  partnership	  and	  its	  current	  impact	  on	  Jakarta	  residents	  3. To	   gather	   ideas	   from	   stakeholders	   about	   “what	  works	   and	  what	   does	   not”	   in	   this	  partnership	  and	  what	   could	  be	  done	   to	  make	   the	   contract	  more	  productive	   in	   the	  




next	  12-­‐years	  of	  the	  contract	  for	  all	  stakeholders.	  	  The	   literature	   review	   focused	   on:	   (1)	   understanding	   the	   context	   of	   public	   private	  partnerships	   in	  drinking	  water	   supply	   in	   Jakarta	  by	   focusing	  on	   several	   cases	  of	   drinking	  water	   privatization	   in	   other	   developing	   countries	   such	   as	   the	  Philippines	   (in	  Manila)	   and	  Argentina	   (Buenos	   Aires);	   and	   	   (2)	   a	   detail	   review	   of	   the	   previous	   studies	   conducted	   on	  public	  -­‐	  private	  partnerships	  in	  drinking	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta.	  	  
1.4.	  Research	  limitations	  This	   paper	   is	   presented	   with	   limitations	   such	   as	   the	   in-­‐availability	   of	   the	   concession	  contract	   to	   the	  public.	  The	   information	  obtained	   to	  examine	   the	  concession	  contract	  were	  based	  on	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  contract	  from	  the	  Jakarta	  Water	  Regulatory	  Body	  and	  based	  on	  interviews	   with	   stakeholders	   involved	   in	   the	   negotiation	   process	   and	   literature	   reviews.	  Another	  limitation	  included	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  writer	  to	  travel	  to	  Jakarta	  to	  conduct	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  and	  site	  visits.	  	  	  






























Chapter	  Two:	  Literature	  Review	  	  	  	  
2.1.	  Purpose	  of	  the	  chapter	  This	  chapter	  presents	  a	  literature	  review	  that	  explains	  the	  history	  of	  public	  drinking	  water	  privatization	  “movement”	  in	  the	  1990s,	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  in	  drinking	  water	  supply	  in	  other	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  achievements,	  and	  critiques	  of	  public	  service	  privatization	   in	  developing	  countries.	  A	  detailed	  review	  of	  the	  previous	  studies	  will	  also	  be	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
2.2.	  History	  of	  public	  drinking	  water	  supply	  privatization	  	  
2.2.1.	  The	  concept	  of	  water	  as	  an	  economic	  good	  	  The	  understanding	  of	  water	  as	  an	  economic	  good	   is	  still	  considered	  controversial	  and	  not	  pro-­‐poor.	  Although	  water	  in	  rivers,	  for	  example,	  is	  available	  for	  public	  use,	  the	  management	  of	  the	  water	  supply	  for	  citizens	  is	  not	  free	  of	  costs.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  deliver	  services	  of	  water	  connections	  to	  the	  population,	  government	  needs	  to	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  capital	  to	  develop	  the	  infrastructure,	  and	  oversee	  its	  maintenance.	  	  	  The	  misconception	  of	  water	  as	  a	  public	  good	  instead	  of	  an	  economic	  good	  contributes	  into	  the	  mismanagement	   of	  water	   resources.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Environment	  and	  Development	  declared	  a	  guiding	  principle	  of	  water	  as	  economic	  goods	  (Briscoe,	  1995,	  p.	  19).	   This	   is	   confirmed	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   informal	   water	   suppliers	   in	   urban	   areas	   in	  developing	  countries	  that	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	  water	  markets	  (Rosegant,	  Cline,	  2002,	  p.	  6).	  Easter	   and	   Archibald	   pointed	   out	   the	   function	   of	   a	   water	  market	   as	   a	   necessity	   to	   bring	  demand	  and	  supply	  into	  balance.	  Further,	  through	  the	  assessment	  of	  water	  markets,	  water	  has	  been	  under-­‐priced	  in	  most	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  (2002,	  p.	  25).	  Rosegant	  and	  Cline	  (2002)	  mentioned	  that	  the	  low	  water	  price	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  causes	  of	  poor	  performance	  of	  water	  supply	  services.	  	  	  




developing	   countries.	   France	   started	   in	   1987,	   while	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   started	   in	   1982	  (Dore,	  Kushner,	  Zumer,	  2004.	  p.	  41).	  The	  public	  -­‐	  private	  partnership	  in	  public	  services	  was	  encouraged	   by	   several	   international	   financial	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  World	   Bank	   in	   the	  1990s	  and	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	   in	   the	  early	  2000s,	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	   private	   sector	   could	   expand	   services	   and	   improve	   efficiency	   better	   than	   the	   public	  sector	   (Hall,	   Lobina,	   2004,	   p.	   268).	   By	   the	   late	   1990s,	   water	   privatization	   had	   started	   in	  many	  countries,	  including	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  	  In	  its	  policy	  paper	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  (1992),	  the	  World	  Bank	  laid	  out	  priorities	  to	  help	  local	  governments	  overcome	  the	  general	  water	  resources	  management.	  The	  World	  Bank	  stated:	  	  
“Governments	  have	  often	  misallocated	  and	  wasted	  water,	  as	  well	  as	  permitted	  damage	  
to	   the	  environment	  as	  a	   result	  of	   institutional	  weaknesses,	  market	   failures,	  distorted	  
policies,	  and	  misguided	  investments.”	  (p.	  3)	  




partners	   with	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   still	   manages	   the	   assets	   and	   later	   will	   be	   the	   sole	  owner	  of	   the	  asset	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  contracts)	  (Pribadi,	  2009,	  p.	  2).	  Table	  1	  describes	  the	  types	  of	  public	  -­‐	  private	  partnerships	  in	  drinking	  water	  supply	  provision.	  	  	  Table	  1.	  Type	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  in	  drinking	  water	  supply	  provision	  Option	   Owner-­‐ship	   Manage-­‐ment	   Invest-­‐ment	   Risk	   Duration	  (years)	   Examples	  Service	  contract	   Public	   Shared	   Public	   Public	   1	  to	  2	   Finland,	   Maharashta	  (India)	  Management	  contract	   Public	   Private	   Public	   Public	   3	  to	  5	   Johannesburg	   (South	  Africa),	   Monagas	  (Venezuela),	   Atlanta	  (United	  States)	  Lease	  (aftermage)	   Public	   Private	   Public	   Shared	   8	  to	  5	   Abidjan	  (Coté	  d'Ivoire,	  Dakar	  (Senegal)	  Concession	   Public	   Private	   Private	   Private	   20	  to	  30	   Manila	   (Philippines),	  Buenos	   Aires	  (Argentina),	   Durban	  (South	  Africa),	  La	  Paz-­‐El	   Alto	   (Bolivia),	  Jakarta	  (Indonesia)	  Privatization	  (state	  divestiture)	   Private	   Private	   Private	   Private	   Unlimited	   Chile,	  United	  Kingdom	  
Source:	  Human	  Development	  Report,	  UNDP,	  2006	  	  In	  concession	  contracts,	   the	  government	  awards	   the	   full	   responsibility	   to	  private	  partners	  to	   deliver	   infrastructure	   services	   including	   operation,	   maintenance,	   collection,	   and	  management	  activities.	  Once	  the	  contract	  is	  ended,	  the	  public	  sector	  becomes	  the	  full	  owner	  of	   the	   facilities	  and	  manages	  the	  system.	  The	  nature	  of	   the	  public	  –	  private	  partnership	   in	  infrastructure	   projects	   including	   water	   supply	   are	   the	   sharing	   of	   investment	   risks,	  responsibilities	   and	   rewards	   between	   public	   and	   private	   partners.	   The	   challenge	   of	  concession	  contracts	  is	  the	  length	  of	  time,	  which	  complicates	  the	  distribution	  of	  profits	  that	  increases	   the	   risks	   external	   to	   the	   contracts,	   such	   as	   change	   of	   power	   or	   administration,	  macroeconomic	  conditions,	  and	  water	  resources	  challenges	  (Wu,	  2008).	  	  




revoked	   in	   2006,	   which	   transferred	   the	   water	   company	   to	   the	   Aquas	   Argentinas	   from	   a	  federal	  company	  Obras	  Sanitarias	  de	  la	  Nación	  (OSN).	  	  	  In	  1993,	   firms	  bid	   to	   the	  concession	  offered	   the	   lowest	   tariff	  and	   favored	   to	   the	  universal	  connections	  of	  households.	  However,	  after	  the	  contract	  was	  in	  effect,	  the	  company	  selected,	  Aguas	   Argentinas,	   increased	   usage	   fees	   13.5	   percent	   and	   charged	   connection	   fees	   that	  reached	   a	   month’s	   maximum	   earning	   for	   a	   household	   at	   the	   official	   poverty	   line.	   The	  company	  lowered	  the	  fees	  only	  after	  a	  public	  unrest	  (Galiani,	  et	  al,	  2005,	  p.	  107).	  	  	  The	  result	  of	  this	  program	  was	  controversial.	  There	  was	  a	  dispute	  whether	  the	  efficiency	  of	  privatization	  was	  created	  by	  investments	  in	  high-­‐income	  areas	  and	  therefore	  excluded	  the	  low-­‐income	  areas	  that	  had	  lower	  return	  investments.	  Privatization	  also	  increased	  efficiency	  by	  reducing	   the	  number	  of	  employees	  by	  half	  and	   increased	   the	   level	  of	  productivity.	  The	  efficiency	  gained	  enabled	  the	  company	  to	  invest	  more	  than	  eight	  times	  of	  what	  the	  previous	  company	  invested	  (US	  $200	  million	  after	  privatization,	  compared	  to	  US	  $25	  million	  prior	  to	  privatization).	  Through	  these	  investments,	  the	  number	  of	  water	  and	  sewerage	  networks	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  expanded	  by	  30	  percent	  and	  20	  percent,	  with	  some	  of	  them	  concentrated	  in	  poorer	  areas.	  The	  experience	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  capital	  city	  and	  differed	  from	  the	   rest	  of	   the	   cases	   in	  other	  municipalities	   in	  Argentina	   since	   in	  other	  municipalities	   the	  development	   of	  water	  network	   to	   the	  poor	   residential	   areas	  were	  minimal	   (Galiani,	   et	   al,	  2005,	  p.	  107).	  	  




Filipino	  Benpress	  Holding;	  and	  (2)	  East	  Zone:	  Manila	  Water	  Company,	  Inc.,	  a	  joint	  venture	  of	  British	   United	   Utilities,	   Bechtel,	   a	   US	   company	   and	   Filipino	   Ayala	   Corporation,	   a	   local	  company	  (see	  Graphic	  1).	  The	  West	  Zone,	  including	  old	  Manila	  and	  the	  southern	  Province	  of	  Cavite,	  represented	  60%	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  East	  Zone,	  including	  the	  business	  district	  of	  Makati	  and	  the	  expanding	  suburbs	  in	  the	  eastern	  part	  of	  the	  City,	  accounted	  for	  40%	  of	  the	  population.	   The	   split	   system	   created	   a	   form	   of	   quasi-­‐competition	   between	   the	   two	  concessionaires,	  which	  actually	  mimicked	  the	  system	  in	  Paris	  that	  was	  split	  on	  each	  bank	  of	  Seine	  River	   (Wu,	  2008).	  The	   contract	  was	  between	   the	   government	   and	  private	  partners,	  while	   MSWW	   retained	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   assets.	   The	   key	   objectives	   were	   to	   rapidly	  improve	   quality	   and	   efficiency,	   expand	   services,	   reduce	   water	   tariffs	   and	   end	   expensive	  government	  subsidies	  (Rosenthal,	  2001,	  p.3).	  	  	  Graphic	  1.	  Metro	  Manila	  Water	  Concession	  Map	  
	  
Source:	  Wu,	  2008	  




Zones,	  with	   investments	  over	  US	  $7	  billion.	  A	  newly	  created	   independent	  regulator	  office,	  MWSS	   Regulatory	   Office,	   was	   created	   outside	   of	   the	   contract.	   	   The	   legal	   basis	   of	   this	  partnership	  was	  the	  Water	  Crisis	  Act	  in	  1995	  and	  the	  Executive	  Order	  311	  (Dumol,	  2000).	  	  	  The	  determination	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  was	  defined	  in	  the	  contract	  as	  the	   prevailing	   rate	   for	   similar	   infrastructure	   projects	   in	   developing	   countries.	   However,	  because	  of	   the	  unexpected	  events	  such	  as	   the	  Asian	   financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  peso	   forced	  one	  of	   the	  concessionaires,	  Mayniland,	   into	  bankruptcy	   in	  2003.	  The	  high	  fixed	  capital	  costs	  and	  the	  increasing	  rate	  of	  returns	  actually	  created	  natural	  monopoly	  (Wu,	  p.	  211,	  2008).	  Mayniland	   returned	   the	  asset	   to	  MWSS,	  but	   the	  East	  Zone	   is	   still	  operating	  now.	  Xun	  Wu	  and	  Malaluan	  (2008)	  mentioned	  that	   there	  are	  external	  and	   internal	   factors	  that	   affected	   this	   result.	   External	   factors	   such	   as	   political	   support,	   institutional	   structure,	  the	   design	   of	   the	   contract,	   transparency	   of	   the	   bidding	   process,	   public	   perception,	   and	  impacts	   of	   unforeseeable	   events	   (such	   as	   severe	   droughts	   and	   devaluation	   of	   the	  Philippines’	   currency)	   disturbed	   the	   target	   coverage,	   and	   internal	   factors	   included	  corporate	  governance,	  financial	  management	  and	  operation	  management	  (p.	  219).	  Although	  corruption	   was	   not	   a	   major	   problem,	   there	   were	   the	   inherent	   weaknesses	   in	   the	  government-­‐owned	   and	   controlled	   corporations	   in	   terms	   of	   personnel,	   procurement,	   and	  financing.	  	  	  
2.5.	   Previous	   studies	   of	   public	   private	   partnership	   in	   Jakarta’s	   water	   supply	  




to	   increase	   Jakarta’s	   capacity	   as	   an	   international	   city.	   The	   focus	   in	   providing	   water	  networks	  to	  the	  poor	  merely	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  expanded	  capacity	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  main	  goal	   of	   this	   partnership.	   This	   is	   confirmed	  by	   Zakaria’s	   study	   that	   despite	   these	  pro-­‐poor	  programs,	  the	  connections	  to	  poor	  households	  were	  minimal.	  	  Zakaria	  mentioned	   that	   the	   issues	   of	   pro-­‐poor	   programs	  were	   affordability	   and	   access	   to	  water.	  However,	   it	  was	  not	   clear	  on	  how	  affordability	  measure	  was	   calculated.	   In	   Jakarta,	  people	  who	  were	  not	  connected	  to	  a	  piped	  water	  network	  bought	  their	  water	  from	  vendors	  and	  paid	  five	  to	  ten	  times	  more	  than	  those	  connected	  to	  the	  piped	  water	  network	  (Watkins,	  2006).	   Therefore,	   there	   must	   be	   other	   factors	   that	   influenced	   the	   low	   number	   of	  connections	   of	   poor	   households.	   One	   factor	   could	   be	   the	   connection	   fee,	   which	   Zakaria	  mentioned	  was	  one	  of	  the	  obstacles	  for	  the	  poor	  to	  connect	  to	  the	  piped	  water	  networks.	  In	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  both	  the	  concessionaires	  provided	  12-­‐month	  and	  24-­‐month	  installments	  of	  payments	  for	  people	  who	  wanted	  to	  establish	  new	  connections	  to	  the	  network.	  Another	  factor	   could	   be	   the	   resistance	   from	   existing	  water	   vendors	  who	  were	   threatened	   to	   lose	  their	   income	   if	   more	   households	   were	   connected	   to	   the	   piped	   water	   network	   (Zakaria,	  2005,	  p.	  29).	  	  Zakaria	  concluded	  that	  cross	  subsidy	  tariff	  scheme	  was	  not	  effective	  to	  increase	  connections	  to	   the	   poor	   households.	   The	   cross	   subsidy	   system	   allowed	   higher	   income	   customers	   to	  subsidize	   lower	   income	   customer,	   but	   failed	   to	   encourage	   customers	   to	   connect	  with	   the	  piped	   water	   network	   (Zakaria,	   2005,	   p.	   29).	   Although	   cross	   subsidy	   tariff	   seemed	   to	   be	  protecting	  lower	  income	  customers,	   it	  created	  a	  steep	  deficit	  in	  the	  operational	  cost	  of	  the	  service.	  	  	  	  Zakaria	   examined	   the	   output-­‐based	   project	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   that	   was	   implemented	   in	  2006.	  The	  global	  output-­‐based	  project	  was	  a	  loan	  program	  to	  increase	  connections	  among	  the	   poor	   households.	   In	   this	   program,	   private	   concessionaires	   invested	   in	   the	   new	  connections,	   and	   if	   the	   targets	   were	   achieved,	   the	   expenses	   of	   the	   project	   would	   be	  reimbursed2.	  	  	  




The	   debate	   whether	   public	   or	   private	   provision	   has	   more	   merit,	   according	   to	   Bakker	  (2008),	  had	  diverted	  attention	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  governance	  reform.	  In	  her	  paper	  published	  in	  World	  Development	   Journal,	  Bakker	   found	   that	  governance	   failure	  produced	   important	  disincentives	   to	  connect	   the	  water	  supply	   to	  poor	  households	  and	   for	  poor	  households	   to	  choose	   to	   connect	   to	   the	  water	   supply	   system.	   She	   documented	  where	   this	   unconnected	  population	   lived	  in	  Jakarta	  through	  GIS-­‐based	  mapping.	   It	  showed	  that	  slums	  areas	  where	  mostly	   not	   covered	   by	   the	   water	   supply	   network.	   In	   addition,	   she	   also	   documented	   that	  poor	  households	  made	  the	  choice	  of	  not	  connecting	  to	  the	  water	  supply	  network	  because	  of	  the	   transaction	   status,	   housing	   and	   residence	   status,	   security	   of	   water	   supply,	   and	  perception	  of	  water	  quality	  (2008,	  p.	  1903).	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including	  shallow	  and	  deep	  wells	  (both	  protected	  and	  unprotected),	  standpipes	  and	  water	  vendors	  (p.	  81).	  	  	  Jakarta’s	   economic	   growth	   in	   2009	  was	   5.01	   percent	   higher	   compared	   to	   2008,	  with	   the	  highest	   growth	   from	   communication	   and	   transportation	   sector	   of	   15.63	   percent,	   services	  6.4	  percent,	  and	  construction	  6.20	  percent.	  The	  Gross	  Domestic	  Regional	  Product	  of	  Jakarta	  is	   IDR	   757.02	   trillion	   (US	   $8.3	   billion)3.	   The	   economic	   development	   in	   Jakarta	   since	  President	   Sukarno	   and	   continued	   to	   President	   Suharto	   administration	   had	   been	   focused	  into	   landmark	   developments	   (such	   as	   the	   National	   Monument	   with	   fire	   shaped	   made	   of	  gold,	  sport	  stadiums,	  museums,	  which	  would	  showcase	  Jakarta	  as	  an	  international	  city).	  	  Jakarta	  consists	  of	  two	  "cities",	  a	  cluster	  of	  high-­‐income	  residents	  in	  gated	  housing	  complex	  and	  a	  series	  of	  kampung	  (village),	  but	  sometimes	  denotes	  poorer	  neighborhoods	  in	  the	  city.	  These	  two	  types	  of	  communities	  represent	  the	  sharp	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  in	  Jakarta.	  Kampung	   is	  not	  synonymous	  with	  slums;	   it	  has	  a	  number	  of	  permanent	  buildings	  with	   a	  mix	   of	  middle	   and	   low-­‐income	   residents.	   It	   is	   estimated	   that	   20	   to	   65	   percent	   of	  Jakarta	   residents	   live	   in	   an	   area	   of	   180	   square	   km	   and	   60-­‐70	   percent	   of	   them	   urban	  kampung,	  with	  population	  density	  of	  30,300	  persons	  per	  square	  kilometers	  (Sujarto,	  2002).	  	  	  About	  four	  to	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  lives	  illegally	  in	  the	  slums	  because	  of	  the	  rising	  cost	   of	   land;	   they	   are	   often	   forced	   to	  move	   out	   of	   their	   "houses".	   In	   Jakarta,	   slums	   have	  grown	   “organically”	   with	   emigration	   from	   the	   surrounding	   villages.	   Residents	   claimed	  abandoned	   spaces	   near	   rivers,	   bridges,	   rail-­‐road	   tracks	   to	   develop	   their	   dwellings	   with	  semi-­‐permanent	  building	  materials.	  Often	   times,	   they	  ended	  up	  staying	   longer	   in	   the	  area	  and	   established	   more	   permanent	   dwellings.	   The	   legality	   of	   land	   has	   prevented	   the	  government	  from	  providing	  any	  services	  to	  these	  areas,	  including	  piped	  water,	  since	  doing	  so	  would	  mean	  recognizing	  the	  area	  and	  their	  land	  ownership.	  	  	  
3.2.	  History	  of	  PAM	  Jaya	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  condition	  of	  water	  supply	  provision	  prior	  to	  the	  public	  -­‐	  private	  partnership,	  the	  history	  of	  PAM	  Jaya	  will	  be	  reviewed.	  Perusahaan	  Air	  Minum	  Jakarta	  Raya,	  (PAM	   Jaya)	   is	   one	   of	   the	  319	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   (SoEs)	   in	   drinking	  water	   supply	   in	  




Indonesia.	   Each	   municipality	   in	   Indonesia	   has	   its	   own	   drinking	   water	   supply	   company	  called	   PDAM	   (Perusahaan	   Daerah	   Air	   Minum).	   The	   history	   of	   PAM	   Jaya	   started	   in	   the	  colonial	  era	  in	  1843,	  when	  Jakarta	  was	  still	  called	  Batavia	  and	  the	  main	  water	  source	  was	  a	  borehole	  well.	  	  	  In	  1920,	  PAM	  Jaya	  used	  water	  resources	   from	  Ciomas-­‐Ciburial	  Bogor,	  an	  adjacent	  suburb,	  with	  the	  capacity	  of	  484	  liters	  per	  second.	  PAM	  Jaya	  continued	  to	  grow	  under	  the	  regional	  government	  by	  increasing	  water	  supply	  capacity	  and	  developing	  water	  plants.	  In	  1977,	  PAM	  Jaya	   was	   managed	   under	   the	   regional	   government	   of	   the	   Jakarta	   Special	   Province	   as	   an	  independent	  water	  company.	  Although	  PAM	  Jaya	  had	  been	  working	  to	  increase	  its	  capacity	  to	  serve	  the	  population,	   it	  was	  unable	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  population	  growth	  of	  the	  city.	  PAM	  Jaya	  was	   able	   to	   serve	   less	   than	  half	   of	   Jakarta’s	   residents	   and	   received	  many	   complaints	  from	   its	   customers	   about	   unreliable	   water	   service	   and	   low	   quality	   of	   water.	   PAM	   Jaya’s	  other	  challenges	  included	  leakage,	  water	  quality,	  and	  water	  resources.	  	  	  Since	  the	  early	  1960s	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1970s	  the	  expansion	  of	  Jakarta	  water	  supply	  was	   funded	  by	   loan	   from	  the	  central	  government.	  PAM	  Jaya	  must	  pay	  back	   its	  debt	   to	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance	   (JWRB,	   2010).	   As	   Indonesia	   was	   in	   the	   beginning	   process	   of	  decentralization,	  budgets	  for	  regional	  development	  came	  from	  the	  Minister	  of	  Home	  Affairs;	  this	  included	  funding	  for	  PAM	  Jaya’s	  operational	  budget.	  In	  1988,	  the	  national	  government	  established	   the	   Regional	   Development	   Account	   to	   unify	   the	   process	   of	   lending	   and	  repayment	  for	  regional	  level	  institutions,	  all	  managed	  under	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance.	   	  PAM	  Jaya	  was	  included	  in	  this	  category.	  The	  central	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  decided	  to	  release	  PAM	  Jaya’s	  operational	  budget	  out	  of	  the	  Daerah	  Khusus	  Ibukota	  Jakarta	  Raya	  or	  the	  Capital	  Special	   Province	   Greater	   Jakarta4;	   and	   it	   was	   responsible	   for	   its	   own	   investment	   and	  operation.	  President	  Suharto	  used	  this	  situation	  to	  strengthen	  his	  order	  for	  the	  concession	  contract,	  while	  this	  situation	  complicated	  the	  concession	  contract	  since	  PAM	  Jaya	  still	  had	  to	  pay	   for	   its	  debt	   to	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	  Regional	  Development	  Account.	   PAM	   Jaya’s	   debt	   from	  prior	   to	   the	  public	   -­‐	   private	   partnership	   has	   influenced	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   concession	   contract	   even	  until	  the	  present.	  	  








Chapter	  Four:	  Jakarta	  Water	  Supply	  Public	  -­	  Private	  Partnership	  	  	  	  
4.1.	  Chronology	  In	  Indonesia,	  local	  governments	  manage	  their	  own	  SoEs	  for	  public	  services,	  including	  PAM	  Jaya	  and	  other	  Perusahaan	  Daerah	  Air	  Minum	  (PDAMs).	  In	  early	  1995,	  the	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta	  became	  a	  great	  concern	  of	  President	  Suharto.	  He	  wanted	  to	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  DKI	   Jakarta	   as	   an	   international	   city,	   especially	   in	  water	   supply.	   At	   that	   time	   the	   City	  was	  having	   a	   hard	   time	   accommodating	   the	   requests	   of	   international	   companies	   to	   open	  branches	  and	  plants	  in	  Jakarta	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  water.	  One	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  national	  budget	   reform	   in	   1998	   was	   that	   the	   management	   of	   the	   Regional	   Development	   Account	  (RDA)	   changed	   from	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Home	  Affairs	   to	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance.	   Since	   then,	  PAM	  Jaya	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  DKI	  Jakarta	  Province	  budget	  and	  was	  expected	  to	  achieve	  full	  cost	  recovery.	  In	  1989,	  the	  water	  sector	  was	  opened	  to	  direct	  foreign	  investment.	  	  	  President	   Suharto	   ordered	   the	   Minister	   of	   Public	   Works,	   Radinal	   Mochtar,	   to	   invite	   DKI	  Jakarta’s	  governor,	  Suryadi	  Sudirja,	   the	  DKI	   Jakarta	  Vice	  Governor,	  Tubagus	  Rais,	  with	   the	  director	  of	  PAM	  Jaya,	  Ir.	  Samsul	  Romli,	  to	  a	  closed-­‐door	  meeting.	  	  In	  the	  meeting	  room,	  Sigit	  Haryoyudanto	  and	  Anthony	  Salim	  were	  already	  waiting.	  The	  meeting	  was	  actually	  a	  briefing	  that	  PAM	  Jaya	  would	  collaborate	  with	  two	  foreign	  companies,	  Thames	  Water	  International	  on	  the	  east	  side	  of	  Ciliwung	  River,	  and	  Suez	  Lyonnaise	  des	  Eaux	  on	  the	  west	  side	  of	  Ciliwung	  River.	  	  	  The	   selection	   of	   private	   partners	   was	   done	   without	   open	   bidding,	   but	   through	   private	  conversations	  between	  President	  Suharto	  and	  the	  ambassadors	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  France,	  who	  supported	  the	   international	  companies	  Thames	  Water	  (United	  Kingdom)	  and	  Suez	   Lyonnaise	   des	   Eaux	   (France).	   A	   negotiation	   process	   was	   started	   soon	   after,	   during	  which	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  Cipta	  Karya	  (part	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Public	  Works)	  led	  the	  negotiation	  team	  that	  included	  PAM	  Jaya.	  The	  World	  Bank	  did	  not	  get	  directly	  involved	  until	  later	  in	  the	  process	  when	  they	  hired	  consultants	  to	  counsel	  the	  Government	  of	  Indonesia5.	  	  	  




The	  negotiation	  ended	  with	  the	  concession	  contract	  that	  was	  signed	  in	  June	  1997,	  with	  the	  effective	   date	   of	   January	   1,	   1998.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   was	   inclined	   to	   sign	   the	  agreement.	   The	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Development	   Control	   from	   the	   president	   administration	  pushed	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	   to	   sign	   the	  agreement	  by	  mid	   January	  1998.	  The	  effective	  date	  became	  February	  1,	  1998.	  Soon	  after,	   in	  May	  1998,	  President	  Suharto	   resigned	   from	  office.	   After	   the	   political	   situation	   returned	   to	   normal,	   the	   ambassadors	   of	   the	   United	  Kingdom	   and	   France	  made	   another	   push	   to	  move	   forward	  with	   the	   contract;	  meanwhile,	  PAM	  Jaya	  was	  still	  managing	  the	  entire	  system.	  	  	  Graphic	  2.	  Map	  of	  DKI	  Jakarta	  concession	  contract	  
	  




Cooperation	  Agreement	  were:	  (1) Raw	  water	   supply:	   PAM	   Jaya	  no	   longer	   acted	   as	   the	  water	   supplier	   to	   the	  private	  companies,	  which	  would	  require	  PAM	  Jaya	  to	  pay	  the	  difference	  in	  raw	  water	  cost	  if	  PAM	   Jaya	   could	   not	   meet	   the	   requirements.	   Instead,	   the	   private	   companies	   dealt	  directly	  with	   the	   state	   owned	   companies	   that	   provided	  water	   such	   as	   Perum	   Jasa	  Tirta,	  PDAM	  Tangerang	  and	  PDAM	  Bogor6.	  	  (2) Procurement:	  PAM	  Jaya	  no	  longer	  was	  responsible	  to	  close	  deep	  wells	  widely	  used	  in	   Jakarta	   among	   hotels	   and	   factories;	   instead,	   private	   partners	   would	   close	   the	  wells	  in	  collaborations	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mine	  and	  Energy.	  (3) Employees:	  Instead	  of	  being	  transferred	  to	  the	  private	  firms	  while	  remain	  working	  under	  PAM	  Jaya,	  PAM	  Jaya	  employees	  will	  be	   the	  private	  partners’	   full	  employees,	  where	  a	  panel	  to	  mediate	  labor	  dispute	  would	  be	  set	  up7.	  (4) Supervision:	  A	  new	  independent	  regulatory	  body,	  along	  with	  PAM	  Jaya,	  could	  audit	  the	   private	   partners,	  where	   there	  would	   be	   sanctions	   and	   penalties	   if	   the	   private	  partners	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  concession	  targets.	  In	  the	  previous	  contract,	  PAM	  Jaya	  could	   not	   retrieve	   data	   from	   private	   partners,	   and	   no	   independent	   auditors	   that	  could	  audit	  the	  private	  partners.	  (5) Escrow	   account:	   The	   private	   partners	   could	   retrieve	  money	   only	  with	   PAM	   Jaya's	  approval	   and	   the	   priority	   was	   to	   pay	   PAM	   Jaya's	   debts.	   Previously,	   the	   private	  partners	  could	  retrieve	  money	  from	  the	  joint	  account	  without	  PAM	  Jaya's	  approval.	  Priority	  of	  the	  escrow	  account	  usage	  was	  to	  for	  the	  private	  partners.	  	  (6) Water	   charge:	   A	   new	   tariff	   was	   to	   be	   recommended	   by	   both	   PAM	   Jaya	   and	   the	  private	  partners	  to	  the	  new	  Regulatory	  Body.	  The	  Regulatory	  Body	  would	  deal	  with	  the	  parliament	  in	  increasing	  the	  new	  water	  charge.	  The	  previous	  short	  fall	  would	  be	  audited	  by	  the	  state	  BPKP	  auditing	  company	  and	  the	  private	  firms	  would	  pay.	  In	  the	  previous	   contract,	   water	   charges	   increase	   automatically	   every	   six	   months	   with	  approval	  from	  the	  Jakarta	  parliaments	  and	  if	  there	  was	  a	  delay,	  the	  short	  fall	  would	  be	  paid	  by	  PAM	  Jaya,	  with	  no	  early	  warning	  system.	  (7) Dispute:	  There	  was	  a	  four-­‐level	  mechanism:	  seeking	  compromise,	  mediating	  by	  the	  Regulatory	  Body,	  mediating	  by	   experts,	   and	   court	   settlements	   both	   in	   Jakarta	   and	  




Singapore.	   The	   previous	   contract	   only	   indicated	   a	   three-­‐level	  mechanism:	   seeking	  compromise,	  mediating	  by	  experts,	  and	  the	  international	  court	  in	  Singapore.	  (8) Regulatory	  body:	  The	  Regulatory	  Body	  and	  PAM	  Jaya	  would	  supervise	  the	  contract.	  	  Source:	  Harsono,	  2004,	  p.	  16-­‐17	  	  The	  private	  partners	  spent	  much	  energy	  in	  accommodating	  the	  request	  to	  balance	  the	  risk	  allocations.	  Overall,	   the	  new	   concession	   contract	  was	   seen	   to	  be	   reasonable	   and	   could	  be	  well	   executed	   if	   followed	   according	   to	   plan.	   Under	   the	   contract,	   a	   new	   regulatory	   body,	  Jakarta	  Water	  Regulatory	  Body	   (JWRB),	  was	   formed	  with	   the	   task	   of	   regulating	   the	   tariff	  and	  water	  charges.	  The	  main	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  regulatory	  body	  were	  to	  mediate	  and	  to	  monitor	  the	  private	  companies.	  	  	  
4.2.	  Contract	  provisions	  	  
4.2.1. Tariff	  and	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  According	   to	   the	   concession	   contract,	   the	   tariff	   setting	   must	   take	   into	   consideration	   its	  social	  function	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  the	  lower	  income	  population	  at	  an	  affordable	  tariff,	  which	  was	  set	  by	  the	  Governor	  of	  Jakarta	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  local	  parliament	  (JWRB,	  2010).	  The	  tariff	  is	  set	  by	  rules	  and	  regulations	  that	  determine	  the	  water	  bills	  for	  customers.	  In	  Jakarta,	  there	  are	  five	  tiers	  of	  tariff	  that	  were	  set	  based	  on	  the	  economic	  condition	  of	  the	  household	  and	  the	  type	  of	  establishment	  as	  seen	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  	  Table	  2.	  Drinking	  Water	  Supply	  Tariff	  (in	  2003)	  
Group	  
Less	  than	  10	  cubic	  
m3	  
(IDR*)	  
Between	  10-­20	  m3	  
(IDR)	  
More	  than	  20	  m3	  
(IDR)	  Group	  1	   500	   500	   500	  Group	  2	   500	   500	   900	  Group	  3-­‐A	   2,250	   3,000	   3,500	  Group	  3-­‐B	   3,250	   4000	   5,000	  Group	  4-­‐A	   4,750	   5,750	   6,750	  Group	  4-­‐B	   9,100	   9,100	   9,100	  Group	  5	  Special	   11,000	   11,000	   11,000	  *	  Note:	  US	  $1	  =	  9,004	  IDR	  
Group	  1	  includes	  houses	  of	  worships,	  orphanages,	  social	  dormitories,	  public	  hydrants	  	  




Group	  3-­A	  includes	  ordinary	  households	  	  
Group	  3-­B	   includes	  middle	  households,	  kiosk,	   small	  workshops,	  nonprofit	  organization,	  home	  
industries	  	  
Group	   4-­A	   includes	   upscale	   households,	   embassies,	   government	   offices,	   business	   companies,	  
military	   facilities,	   restaurants,	   service	   offices,	   medical	   facilities,	   privately-­owned	   hospitals,	  
small	  industries,	  non-­	  star	  hotels	  
Group	  4-­B	  includes	  star-­hotels,	  motel,	  nightclub,	  café,	  banks,	  service	  stations,	  high-­rise	  
buildings,	  condominiums,	  ice	  industries,	  chemical	  industries,	  warehouses,	  textile,	  
entertainment	  centers,	  factories	  	  




The	  revenue	  sharing	  diagram	  below	  describes	  the	  flow	  of	  payment	  and	  revenue	  sharing	  in	  this	  water	  supply	  system.	  Tariff	  payments	  go	  to	  the	  escrow	  account,	  and	  from	  this	  escrow	  account	  private	   concessionaires	   collect	   the	   amount	   of	   payment	  based	  on	   the	  water	  billed	  (per	  m3).	  	  Graphic	  3.	  Revenue	  Sharing	  Mechanism	  
	  




Model	   (CAPM)	   (Jensen,	   2005,	   p.	   41).	   According	   to	   the	   CAPM,	   the	   return	   on	   the	   project	  should	  be	  equal	   to	   the	  return	   that	   the	  company	  can	  earn	  on	  a	  risk-­‐free	   investment	  plus	  a	  premium	   reflecting	   non-­‐diversifiable	   risk.	   The	   Indonesian’s	   Rupiah	   exchange	   rate	   against	  the	  US	  dollar	  was	  US	  $1	  to	  IDR	  2,500	  in	  1997;	  after	  1998,	  the	  currency	  devaluated	  by	  almost	  80%	  to	  US	  $1	  to	  IDR	  10,000.	  Although	  the	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  was	  also	  calculated	  based	  on	   the	  projection	  of	   operating	   costs,	   capital	   expenditures	   and	   financing	   costs,	   this	   rate	   of	  return	   was	   not	   addressed	   in	   the	   RCA	   of	   2001	   and	   remained	   in	   the	   concession	   contract.	  Jensen	   (2005)	  calculated	   Jakarta’s	   concession	   internal	   rate	  of	   return	  based	  on	  CAPM	  with	  the	  result	  of	  14.73	  percent	  could	  have	  made	  the	  contract	  look	  attractive	  to	  private	  sector	  (p.	  41).	  	  	  




Table	  3:	  Technical	  targets	  for	  concession	  contract	  
Items	   Year	  5	   Year	  10	   Year	  20	   Year	  25	  Volume	  of	  Water	  Sold	  (million	  m3)	   342	   398	   419	   428	  Non-­‐Revenue	  Water	  lost	  (%)	   35	   25	   20	   20	  Service	  Coverage	  (%)	   70	   75	   98	   100	  Population	  Served	  (million)	   6.72	   7.57	   10.83	   11.43	  Water	  Quality	   Clean	  water	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Year	  9	   Potable	  water	  starting	  Year	  10	  Pressure	   7.5	  m	  in	  the	  whole	  area,	  except	  Pluit	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Year	  5	  
7.5	  m	  in	  the	  whole	  area,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Year	  10	  
7.5	  m	   7.5	  m	  
Source:	  Jakarta	  Water	  Regulatory	  Body,	  2010	  	  The	  other	  requirements	  for	  the	  targets	  were:	  1. Volume	  of	  water	  produced	  2. Non-­‐revenue	  water	  3. Number	  of	  new	  connections	  4. Service	  coverage	  5. Quality	  of	  water	  supplied	  6. Water	  pressure	  7. Response	  time	  to	  customer	  (complaints,	  request	  for	  connections,	  etc.)	  	  The	  investment	  schedule	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  target	  set	  in	  the	  contract,	  but	  was	  negotiated	  every	  five	  years.	  	  	  




resources	   are	   controlled	   by	   the	   State	   and	   are	   used	   for	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   the	   people.	   In	  1996,	   an	   Instruction	   of	  Minister	   of	  Home	  Affairs	  No.21	   set	   up	   procedures	   for	   the	   private	  sector	   to	   invest	   in	  water.	   To	   legalize	   the	   current	   private	   sector	   involvement	   in	   the	  water	  sector,	   the	   Indonesian	   Parliament	   passed	   Water	   Resources	   Law	   in	   February	   2004	   (Hall,	  2004,	  p.	  17);	  however,	  this	  new	  law	  was	  six	  years	  after	  the	  first	  concession	  contract	  in	  1998.	  This	  new	  water	   law	   is	  part	  of	   the	  precondition	  of	  a	  USD	  300	  million	   loan	   from	  the	  World	  Bank	  known	  as	  Water	  Resources	  Sector	  Adjustment	  Loan	  (WATSAL).	  	  	  




Trade	   Law)	  with	   an	   arbitrator	   appointed	   by	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   Singapore	   International	  Arbitration	   Centre.	   Until	   today,	   there	   has	   been	   no	   dispute	   taken	   to	   arbitration	   (Jensen,	  2005,	  p.	  21).	  	  
	  
4.2.5.	  Periodic	  rate	  review	  or	  rate	  rebasing	  PAM	  Jaya	  has	  outstanding	  debt	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  prior	  to	  the	  concession	  contract.	  Some	  of	  the	  water	  tariff	  revenue	  collected	  was	  used	  to	  pay	  this	  debt	  instead	  of	  being	  used	  to	  pay	  the	  water	  billed	  to	  the	  private	  concessionaires.	  This	  condition	  had	  caused	  PAM	  Jaya	  to	  owe	  more	  than	  US	  $100	  million	  to	  the	  private	  concessionaires	  in	  2004	  and	  has	  influenced	  the	  flow	  of	  investment	  scheduled	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  private	  sector.	  Shortfalls	  in	  investments	  translated	  into	  unmet	  targets	   in	  network	  expansions	  and	  new	  water	  plants	  developments.	  The	  Jakarta	  Government	  set	  up	  an	  Independent	  Combined	  Expert	  team	  that	  included	  JWRB	  to	   exercise	   periodic	   rate	   reviews	   (rate	   rebasing)	   and	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   basis	   for	   future	  tariffs	   (Lanti,	   2005,	  p.	   253).	  A	   long	  process	  of	  negotiation	   could	  not	   reach	  any	  agreement	  until	  2005,	  when	  the	  private	  partners	  and	  PAM	  Jaya	  accepted	  the	  agreement	  mediated	  by	  JWRB	  (Lanti,	  2005,	  p.	  253).	  	  An	   on-­‐going	   issue	   that	   includes	   periodic	   tariff	   increases	   has	   continued	   since	   2005.	   JWRB	  faces	   challenges	   to	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   customers	   and	   the	   relationship	   with	   private	  partners	  and	  PAM	  Jaya,	  since	  JWRB	  was	  created	  under	  the	  concession	  contract.	  	  








4.4.	  Progress	  Table	  4.	  Table	  of	  progress	  1995,	  2004,	  and	  2009	  	   1995	   2004	   2009	  Population	   9,116,000	   9,695,600	   9,900,000	  Connections	   354,952	   610,806	   780,000	  Service	  Coverage	   27%	   51%	   62%	  Staff	   2,139	   3,256	   	  Annual	  Operation	  and	  Management	  Cost:	  	   US	  $24.6	  milion	   US	  $89.6	  million	   US	  $153.8	  million	  Annual	  Revenue:	   n/a	   US	  $67	  million	   US	  $40	  million	  	  Annual	  capital	  expenditure:	   US	  $16.8	  million	   US	  $78.6	  million	   US	  $129.3	  million	  Production	  and	  distribution	  Ground	  water:	  	   Nil	   Nil	   Nil	  Surface	  water	   100%	   100%	   100%	  Tariff	  Average	  tariff	   US	  $0.611/m3	   US	  $0.285/m3	   US	  $0.798/m3	  Lowest	  tariff	   	   US	  $0.055/m3	   US	  $0.116/m3	  Efficiency	  indicators:	  Non-­‐revenue	  water	   53%	   51%	   In	   the	   west	   side	  PAM	   Lyonnaise	  Jaya	   NRW	   42%	  in	   the	   east	   side,	  Aetra	   is	   45-­‐46%	  of	   NRW	   at	   the	  end	  of	  2009	  
Source:	   Asian	   Development	   Bank,	   1997,	   2004;	   	   PAM	   Jaya,	   2010;	   Jakarta	  Water	   Regulatory	  
Body,	  2010	  	  




the	  community,	  where	  one	   jerigen8	  would	  cost	  about	   IDR	  400	  to	  500	  (compared	  with	  IDR	  2,000	  sold	  by	  water	  vendors).	  This	  water	  kiosks	  program	  received	  positive	  feedback	  from	  the	   community	   although	   water	   vendors	   protested	   since	   they	   now	   have	   to	   compete	   with	  lower	  prices	  of	  water	  in	  certain	  kampung	  with	  water	  kiosks9.	  	  
4.4.2.	  Raw	  water	  sources	  Raw	  water	  source	  is	  a	  critical	  issue	  for	  Jakarta.	  The	  availability	  of	  raw	  water	  influenced	  the	  decision	  to	   invest	   in	  new	  water	  plants,	  which	   later	  determined	  the	  capacity	  to	  expand	  the	  piped	  water	  network.	  Water	  production	  is	  very	  much	  influenced	  by	  the	  availability	  and	  the	  quality	   of	   raw	   water.	   When	   raw	   water	   is	   highly	   polluted,	   rigorous	   water	   treatment	   is	  needed	  to	  produce	  decent	  quality	  drinking	  water.	  Often	  times,	  this	  condition	  was	  worsened	  by	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  mud	  water	  in	  rainy	  season;	  the	  water	  supply	  needed	  to	  be	  cut	  off	  when	  turbidity	  was	  high	  because	  of	  heavy	  rain,	  which	  generated	  complaints	  from	  customers.	  	  	  	  Jakarta’s	   raw	   water	   sources	   originated	   from	   Perum	   Jasa	   Tirta	   II,	   IPA	   Cisadane	   PDAM	  Tangerang,	   Tarum	   Kanal	   Barat,	   Ciliwung	   River,	   Krukut	   River,	   Citarum	   River,	   and	  Pesanggrahan	  River.	  The	  raw	  water	  supply	  from	  Citarum	  River	  went	  through	  several	  dams,	  and	  distributed	  through	  an	  open	  canal	  that	  flows	  through	  industrial	  settlement	  areas	  where	  pollution	  level	  is	  very	  high	  (Tutuko,	  2001).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Graphic	  4.	  Water	  sources	  of	  Jakarta	  
	  
Source:	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  2004	  	  The	  first	   five	  years	  of	  the	  contract	  after	  RCA	  (2001	  -­‐	  2004),	   the	  private	  partners	  were	  not	  able	   to	   achieve	   the	   targets	   such	   as	   reducing	   non-­‐revenue	   water	   and	   volume	   water	   sold.	  Targets	   achieved	  were	   service	   coverage	   ratio,	   respond	   to	   customers,	   and	  water	  pressure.	  For	   the	   second	   five	   years,	   the	   private	   partners	   performed	   better;	   in	   2009,	   there	   were	  780,000	  customers	  that	  covered	  62%	  of	  Jakarta10.	  	  	  According	   to	   PAM	   Jaya,	   this	   improved	   quality	   and	   customer	   service	   were	   supported	   by	  studies	  conducted	  by	  several	  organizations	  to	  measure	  the	  performance	  of	  private	  partners:	  (1)	   Customer	   research	   by	   TNC,	   an	   international	   think	   tank:	   79%	   customers	   satisfied,	   5%	  not	   satisfied.	   International	   standard	   of	   satisfaction	   is	   49%	   while	   Jakarta	   is	   48%;	   (2)	  
                                                




Puskaptis	   (Pusat	   Penelitian	   Kebijaksanaan	   Strategis	   –	   Center	   of	   Research	   for	   Policy	   and	  Strategies);	  and	  (3)	  Litbang	  Kompas	  research:	  December	  29,	  2009	  –	  rate	  of	  satisfaction	  3.8	  out	  of	  7	  points,	  ahead	  of	  other	  public	  services	  such	  as	  electricity	  and	  roads.	  	  	  
4.4.3.	  	  Change	  of	  ownership	  In	  2006,	  both	  Thames	  and	  Palyja	   started	   to	   sell	   their	   shares	   to	  national	  and	   international	  investors	   (Setyawan,	   2006).	   At	   that	   time,	   a	   German	   utility	   company	   purchased	   Thames	  Water	   International.	   Thames	   Water	   International	   withdrew	   from	   international	   water	  business	   to	   focus	   on	   electricity.	   Thames	   PAM	   Jaya	   was	   bought	   by	   P.T.	   Aetra	   Air	   Jakarta	  (Aetra	  Jakarta	  Water)	  in	  April	  2008	  (Setyawan,	  2006).	  	  	  




Table	  5.	  Tariff	  increase	  in	  2007	  
Types	  of	  Customers	  
Tariff	  Group	   	   0-­‐10	  m3	  IDR	   11-­‐20	  m3	  IDR	   >	  20	  m3	  IDR	  1	   Social	   services	   house,	   orphanage,	  places	   of	   religious	   worship,	  hydrants	  and	  public	  tap	   1,050	   1,050	   1,050	  2	   State	   hospitals,	   very	   poor	  households,	  very	  poor	  apartments	   1,059	   1,050	   1,575	  3A	   Poor	  household	  dwelling,	  poor	  apartments,	  water	  stations	  and	  water	  tanks	   3,550	   4,700	   5,500	  
3B	  
Middle	  income	  household	  dwelling,	  middle	  income	  apartment	  dwelling,	  small	  establishments/restaurants,	  small	  businesses	  in	  households,	  non-­‐commercial	  private	  organization,	  small	  business	  
4,800	   6,000	   7,450	  
4A	   Middle	  -­‐	  upper	  income	  households,	  embassy,	  government	  institutions,	  foreign	  institution,	  commercial	  private	  organization,	  educational	  institution,	  military	  offices	  
6,825	   8,150	   9,800	  
4B	   Hotels/motel/cottage,	  bank.	  Service	  Station,	  high	  rise	  buildings,	  apartment,	  factories,	  other	  industries	  and	  establishments	  
12,550	   12,550	   12,650	  
5	   Harbor/port	   14,650	   14,650	   14,650	  




Cross-­‐subsidy	   in	   the	   tariff	   structure	   created	   an	   imbalance	   revenue	   for	   PAM	   Jaya	   and	   the	  private	   partners.	   In	   order	   to	   maintain	   affordability	   of	   the	   network	   to	   the	   low-­‐income	  residents,	   the	  tariff	  was	  set	   in	   five	  groups,	  where	  the	   low-­‐income	  residents	  pay	  about	  one	  thirteenth	  of	   the	   real	   operating	   cost	   of	  water	  per	  meter	   cubed	   (group	   I:	   IDR	  1,050,	  while	  group	  V:	  IDR	  14,500)	  so	  that	  every	  low-­‐income	  customer	  connected	  is	  a	  loss	  making.	  	  
4.4.5. Connection	  fees	  According	   to	   KruHa	   (People's	   Coalition	   for	   the	   Right	   to	   Water),	   connection	   fees	   are	  approximately	   	   IDR	  10,000,000.	  The	  private	  partners	  established	   lump	  sum	  payments	   for	  connection	   fees	   that	   helped	   future	   customers	   to	   connect	   to	   the	   piped	   water	   network.	  However,	   connection	   fees	   are	   more	   than	   a	   month's	   minimum	   wage,	   while	   many	   poor	  households	  have	  irregular	  incomes.	  Connection	  fees	  are	  also	  more	  expensive	  the	  further	  the	  dwelling	  is	  from	  the	  piped	  network.	  Poor	  households	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  areas	  without	  networks	  or	  in	  areas	  of	  lower	  network	  density.	  	  	  Table	  6.	  New	  Connection	  Costs	  	  
Group	   Connection	  Cost	  1	   IDR	  627,500	  (US	  $69.65)	  2	   IDR	  627,500	  (US	  $69.65)	  3A	   IDR	  961,500	  (US	  $129.48)	  3B	   IDR	  961,500	  (US	  $106.72)	  4A	   IDR	  1,166,500	  (US	  $129.48)	  4B	   IDR	  1,166,500	  (US	  $129.48)	  5	   IDR	  1,166,500	  (US	  $129.48)	  
Source:	  Palyja	  and	  Aetra,	  2010	  	  
	  




	  Over	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  target	  in	  network	  investments.	  	  Graphic	  5	  shows	  the	   total	   investments	  made	  by	  private	  partners,	  Palyja	  and	  Aetra/TPJ	   from	  1998	   to	  2008.	  We	  can	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  gap	  between	  the	  two	  partners	  in	  terms	  of	  investments	  and	  spending	  in	  network	  expansions.	  	  In	   2006,	   the	  World	   Bank	   introduced	   the	   Output-­‐based	   Scheme	   to	   aid	  with	   investment	   in	  drinking	  water	   supply	   that	   helped	   the	   private	   partners	   create	   significant	   progress	   in	   the	  investment	   schedule.	  With	   an	  Output-­‐based	   Scheme,	   an	   investment	  would	   be	   refunded	   if	  the	  project	  achieved	  the	  specified	  target.	  The	  Output-­‐based	  program	  was	  implemented	  from	  2005	  –	  2009,	  where	  about	  11,000	  new	  connections	  were	  established	  in	  the	  Palyja	  area.	  	  All	  of	   these	  connections	  were	  categorized	   in	   tariff	  group	  I,	  where	  connection	  fees	  were	  about	  USD	  69.65	  and	  the	  customers	  paid	  about	  USD	  0.116	  (IDR	  1,050)	  per	  m3	  of	  water	  use11.	  	  There	   is	   a	   distinctive	   gap	   between	  Palyja	   and	  TPJ/Aetra’s	   total	   investments	   since	   1998	   –	  2008,	   even	   though	   the	   two	   shares	   almost	   equal	   areas	   and	   populations	   of	   Jakarta	   (see	  Graphic	  5).	  Palyja	  shows	  a	  better	  performance	  overall	  compare	  to	  TPJ/Aetra	  including	  the	  achievements	  of	  targets	  such	  as	  the	  reduce	  percentage	  of	  non-­‐revenue	  water	  loss.	  However,	  PAM	  Jaya/JWRB	  still	  has	  no	  legible	  reason	  to	  terminate	  the	  contract	  since	  the	  TPJ/Aetra	  still	  meets	  the	  70%	  expansion	  targets	  requirements	  of	  the	  RCA	  2001	  (Graphic	  6).	  	  	  	  	  
                                                




Graphic	  5.	  Total	  investments	  for	  both	  Palyja	  and	  TPJ/Aetra	  
	  
Source:	  Jakarta	  Water	  Regulatory	  Body,	  2010	  
*Note:	  numbers	  are	  not	  adjusted	  to	  inflation	  (US	  $1	  =	  IDR	  9,004)	  	  Graphic	  6.	  Percentage	  of	  investments	  used	  for	  network	  expansion	  

































                                                




Chapter	  5:	  Conceptual	  approach	  to	  handing	  conflict	  	  	  	  The	  history	  of	  the	  public	  -­‐	  private	  partnership	  in	  Jakarta	  has	  been	  full	  with	  conflict	  over	  the	  years.	  Private	  partners	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  not	  meeting	  the	  targets	  of	  the	  contracts	  such	  as	  network	  expansion,	  increasing	  water	  quality,	  implementing	  higher	  tariffs	  and	  many	  other	  issues	  mentioned	   in	  previous	   chapters.	  Despite	   these	   conditions,	  however,	   the	   contract	   is	  still	  in	  place,	  and	  the	  private	  partners	  are	  still	  operating	  as	  the	  manager	  of	  the	  water	  supply	  in	  Jakarta.	  	  	  After	  analyzing	  the	  condition	  and	  progress	  of	   the	  drinking	  water	  provision	   in	   Jakarta,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   the	   issues	   lie	   in	   the	   conflicts	   among	   the	   organizations.	   This	   chapter	   aimes	   to	  analyze	  these	  conflicts	  using	  the	  four-­‐quadrant	  analysis	  and	  seven	  elements	  analysis	  tool	  to	  propose	   recommendations	   that	   can	  assist	   in	   increasing	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  entire	  system	  in	  the	  next	  twelve	  years	  of	  the	  concession	  contract.	  	  
5.1.	  Parties	  Understanding	   interests	   is	   key	   in	   handling	   conflict.	   Every	   party	   has	   its	   own	  perspectives,	  based	   on	   its	  worldviews,	  motivations,	   and	   positions	   defined.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   know	   the	  underlying	  motives	  and	  worldviews	  in	  order	  to	  best	  meeting	  their	  needs.	  	  	  




governments.	  	  	  	  PAM	  Jaya	  has	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  target	  of	  90%	  drinking	  water	   supply	   coverage	   by	   2015.	   However,	   with	   only	   62%	   coverage	   in	   2009,	   this	   target	  could	   easily	   be	   a	   big	   challenge.	  Adding	  28%	  coverage	   in	   a	   five-­‐year	  period	   is	   unheard	  of,	  even	  with	  the	  public-­‐private	  partnerships.	  Other	  cities	   in	   Indonesia,	  such	  as	  Surabaya	  and	  Palembang,	   have	   achieved	   90%	   coverage.	   PAM	   Jaya	   tried	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal	   by	   pushing	  efficiency	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   concessionaires’	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   operating	   expenses,	   using	  new	  technology	  to	  control	  non-­‐revenue	  water	  loss,	  and	  increasing	  efficiency	  of	  the	  escrow	  account	  to	  control	  its	  debt	  to	  the	  concessionaires.	  	  
5.1.2.	  Concessionaires/private	  partners:	  TPJ/Aetra	  and	  Palyja	  The	  concessionaires/private	  partners	  are	  interested	  in:	  (1)	  maximizing	  returns	  over	  the	  life	  of	   the	   contract;	   and	   (2)	   complying	   with	   the	   firm's	   international	   strategy.	   TPJ	   identified	  institutional	   efficiency	   as	   one	   of	   the	   main	   challenges	   of	   progress	   of	   the	   public-­‐private	  partnership.	  Since	  the	  decision	  to	  bring	   in	   the	  private	  sector	  did	  not	  come	  from	  PAM	  Jaya	  but	  from	  President	  Suharto,	  in	  the	  beginning	  there	  were	  strong	  resistances	  from	  PAM	  Jaya	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo.	  
 
 




mediate	   conflicts	   among	   the	   partners.	   Since	   the	   budget	   source	   of	   JWRB	   comes	   from	   the	  tariff	  revenue	  of	  PAM	  Jaya,	  JWRB	  has	  limited	  human	  resource	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  officials	  to	  hire.	   Currently	   JWRB	   employed	   a	   number	   of	   officials	   of	   part-­‐time	   researchers	   who	   have	  limited	   time	   to	   devote	   to	   the	   organization.	   Because	   of	   its	   limited	   budget,	   JWRB	   has	   been	  unable	   to	   pursue	   sanctions	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   private	   partners	   to	   achieve	   targets	   of	   the	  contract	   through	   legal	   actions.	   The	   regulatory	   body	   is	   interested	   in	   defending	   the	  customers’	  interest	  for	  better	  quality	  of	  water	  supply	  service	  as	  well	  as	  negotiating	  between	  private	  partners	  and	  PAM	  Jaya.	  	  	  
5.1.4.	  Customers	  representations	  (YLKI	  and	  NGOs,	  DKI	  Jakarta	  Province	  Legislative	  Body)	  YLKI	   (Yayasan	   Lembaga	   Konsumen	   Indonesia	   or	   Indonesian	   Foundation	   for	   Customers	  Protection)	  along	  with	  other	  NGOs	  interested	  in	  the	  water	  supply	  provision	  has	  been	  active	  in	  voicing	  the	  concerns	  of	  customers	  regarding	  the	  services	  of	  PAM	  Jaya.	  	  YLKI	  and	  NGOs	  are	   interested	   in	  customers	  receiving	  water	  supply	  services	   that	  meet	   the	  quality	  and	  quantity	   they	  need,	  while	  keeping	   low	  prices	  of	   the	   service,	   especially	   for	   the	  low-­‐income	  residents	  of	  Jakarta.	  	  	  




5.1.6.	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works,	  DKI	  Jakarta	  division	  The	   Ministry	   of	   Public	  Works	   manages	   several	   institutions	   in	   the	   water	   sector,	   not	   only	  drinking	  water.	  The	  Ministry	  faces	  challenges	  in	  increasing	  capacity	  in	  management	  of	  the	  existing	  water	   sector	   system.	  The	  Ministry	  of	   Public	  Works	  holds	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	  management	   of	   the	   raw	   water	   sector	   as	   it	   coordinates	   this	   effort	   with	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Environment	  	  
5.1.7.	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  is	  interested	  in	  having	  a	  significant	  and	  steady	  payment	  from	  PAM	  Jaya	   for	   its	   debt	   for	   the	   investment	   in	   drinking	  water	   sector	   since	   the	   reformation	   of	   the	  budget	  allocation	  in	  1998.	  	  	  
	  




neglecting	  the	  state	  of	  its	  citizens.	  According	  to	  KruHa,	  the	  state	  should	  allocate	  more	  of	  the	  budget	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	   water	   supply	   network,	   knowing	   that	   national	   budget	   is	  growing	  every	  year.	  	  Within	   the	   investment	  argument,	  KruHa	  also	  challenged	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  private	  partners	  have	  obtained	  funding	  through	  selling	  their	  assets	  to	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investors;	  PAM	  Jaya	  could	  do	   the	  same	  with	   its	  assets.	  KruHa	   is	  concerned	  with	   the	   large	  amount	  of	  debt	  that	   the	  private	   companies	  have	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   residents	  have	  been	  burdened	  by	   these	  debts	  by	  paying	  higher	  tariff.	  	  	  	  Other	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   such	   as	   Yayasan	   Lembaga	   Konsumen	  Indonesia/Indonesian	  Consumers	  Organization	  (YLKI),	  Urban	  Poor	  Consortium,	  Komunitas	  Pelanggan	   Air	   /	   Community	   of	   Water	   Customers,	   Assosiasi	   Kontraktor	   Indonesia	  (Indonesian	  Contractors	  Association)	  challenged	  the	  tariff	  increase	  of	  9.49%	  for	  	  customers	  group	  1	  (orphanages),	  group	  2	  (low-­‐income	  households,	  from	  550	  IDR/m3	  to	  900	  IDR/m3)	  in	   July	   2005.	   	   KruHa	   is	   also	   active	   in	   conducting	   research	   and	   releases	   reports	   on	   the	  progress	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnership.	  	  	  




quadrant	   is	   the	   "general	   approaches"	   and	   contains	   possible	   strategies	   to	   overcome	  identified	  diagnoses.	  The	  fourth	  quadrant	  is	  "action	  ideas”	  that	  describes	  possible	  solutions	  through	  actions	  by	  the	  parties	  involved.	  	  
5.3.	  Partisan	  perceptions	  Every	  party’s	  perception	  of	   the	  conflict	  has	   to	  be	  defined	   to	  understand	   the	  conflict.	  Each	  party's	   perspective	   is	   different	   based	   on	   its	   position	   in	   the	   conflict,	   its	   needs	   and	   its	  situation.	  	  	  
5.4.	  Four-­quadrant	  analysis:	  applications	  to	  Jakarta	  water	  supply	  provision	  	  








	  PAM	   Jaya	   and	   private	   concessionaires	   needs	   to	   create	   a	   new	   concession	   contract	  amendment	  to	  set	  up	  a	  clear	  system	  for	  tariff	  increases,	  rate	  rebasing,	  and	  tariff	  levels.	  This	  amendment	   should	   also	   address	   a	   negotiation	   effort	   to	   reduce	   the	   internal	   rate	   of	   return	  since	   the	   condition	  of	   the	   country,	   the	   risk	   of	   the	  project,	   security,	   and	  other	   factors	   that	  influence	  the	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  have	  changed	  considerably.	  	  Although	  non-­‐revenue	  water	   loss	  was	   significantly	   reduced	   in	   the	   last	   five	  years,	   the	   rate	  (40%)	   is	   still	   higher	   than	   the	   international	   standard	   of	   30%.	   PAM	   Jaya	   and	   private	  concessionaires	   should	   continue	  working	   to	   increase	   efficiency	  of	   existing	   connections	   so	  that	  the	  available	  water	  can	  be	  translated	  to	  increasing	  the	  network.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  raw	  water	  supply	  and	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  raw	  water	  availability	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  sources	   of	   low	   water	   quality,	   unreliable	   service	   of	   the	   network,	   and	   an	   obstacle	   to	   new	  development	   water	   plants.	   PAM	   Jaya	   and	   private	   partners	   should	   work	   on	   providing	   a	  solution	  to	  the	  raw	  water	  supply.	  	  	  




subsidy	  tariff	  also	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  imbalanced	  budget	  between	  the	  tariff	  and	  water	   charge	   putting	   PAM	   Jaya	   into	   a	   difficult	   position	   between	   paying	   the	   fees	   to	   the	  concessionaires	  or	  debts	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance.	  	  	  The	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  was	  still	  based	  on	  the	  economic	  conditions	  and	  risk	  calculations	  of	  1995,	  which	  did	  not	  reflect	   the	  condition	  and	  risk	   in	  2001	  and	  the	  current	  condition	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  project.	  	  The	   issue	  of	  water	   theft	  has	   increased	  partly	  because	  of	   the	   inefficient	   tracking	  system	  of	  water	  distributed	  versus	  water	  charged	  and	   lack	  of	  water	   theft	  enforcement	  system.	  PAM	  Jaya	   and	   private	   partners	   should	   be	  working	   to	   create	   a	   better	   system	   in	   tracking	  water	  delivered	  and	  enforcement	  system	  for	  their	  employees.	  	  




5.4.4.	  Quadrant	  IV:	  specific	  actions	  The	  Governor	  of	   Jakarta	  has	  a	  major	  role	   in	  the	  conflict	  between	  PAM	  Jaya	  and	  its	  private	  partners	   and	   in	   making	   a	   political	   decision	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   regulatory	   body	   that	   has	  	  independence	   and	   authority	   to	  mediate,	   negotiate,	   and	   regulate	   the	   water	   supply	   sector.	  The	  regulatory	  body	  has	   to	   involve	  customers	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	   regulatory	  purpose	   to	  hold	  PAM	  Jaya	  and	   the	  concessionaires	  accountable	   for	  any	  unmet	   targets	   for	   the	  next	  12	  years.	  	  The	  new	  regulatory	  body	  has	  to	  revisit	  the	  concession	  contract	  and	  develop	  an	  amendment	  that	  fills	  the	  gap	  of	  the	  rate	  rebasing	  and	  tariff	   increase	  process.	  The	  new	  regulatory	  body	  should	  conduct	  a	  willingness-­‐to-­‐pay	  survey	  to	  customers	  and	  non-­‐customers	  to	  set	  the	  base	  of	  tariff	  and	  a	  new	  tariff	  structure.	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  Local	  capacity	  issues	  such	  as	  employees	  allegedly	  providing	  aid	  to	  residents	  to	  steal	  water	  is	  another	   challenges	   that	   PAM	   Jaya	   and	   private	   partners	   have	   faced.	   The	   difficulties	   to	  discipline	   employees	   and	   to	   take	   actions	   for	   their	   misconduct	   continue	   to	   hinder	   the	  efficiency	  of	   the	  water	   supply	   system	   to	  provide	  a	  better	   service	   to	   residents.	  The	   lack	  of	  regulation	  and	  enforcement	  have	  contributed	  to	  this	  on-­‐going	  issue.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  management	  of	  water	  supply	  network,	  the	  issue	  of	  water	  scarcity	  is	  another	  major	   challenge	   not	   just	   for	   the	   drinking	   water	   sector	   but	   also	   for	   tourism,	   agriculture,	  industry,	   and	   health.	   An	   integrated	   strategy	   to	   manage	   raw	   water	   supply	   would	   require	  collaborations	  with	  other	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  and	  especially	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works.	  	  	  Despite	  unmet	   technical	   targets	  and	  customer	  service,	   the	  concession	  contract	   is	   in	  place,	  the	  water	  supply	  network	  is	  expanding,	  and	  the	  private	  concessionaires	  are	  still	  operating.	  Another	  question	  raised	  is,	  “What	  is	  PAM	  Jaya’s	  preparation	  to	  take	  over	  the	  management	  after	  the	  concession	  contract	  is	  ended	  in	  2022?”	  	  	  
6.2.	  Recommendations	  From	   my	   journey	   researching	   this	   story,	   I	   propose	   several	   options	   to	   overcome	   the	  problems:	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